versión impresa ISSN 1016-913X
BRUNSTEINS, Patricia. Some reflections on mental simulation and the first-person perspective. arete [online]. 2008, vol.20, n.1, pp. 7-38. ISSN 1016-913X.
It is usual to consider the theories of rationality, the theories of theory and the theories of mental simulation as diverse strategies of mental attribution, each one of which, from a traditional conception, would be unique and exhaustive. In this paper I examine some versions of the mental simulation theory and particularly the perspective whence they describe mental attribution. Finally, from certain critiques, I reformulate the sense of the first-person perspective that these theories, in my view, sustain. I attempt to show that a mental attribution theory based solely in the first-person perspective could not include all mental attribution cases and would not be an exhaustive strategy, unique and independent, leaving an open space for other interpretative strategies.
Palabras llave : mental attribution; simulation theory; first-person; perspectives; theory.