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versión impresa ISSN 1016-913X

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ENGEL, Pascal. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value. arete [online]. 2011, vol.23, n.1, pp.25-52. ISSN 1016-913X.

Some philosophers who defend "pragmatic encroachment" and "sensitive invariantism" argue that changes in the importance of being right and significant increases of the costs of error in given contexts can alter the standards of knowledge. If this view were correct, it could explain to some extent the practical value of knowledge. This paper argues that the pragmatic encroachment thesis is wrong. It discusses three possible sources of encroachment on epistemic notions: on belief, on justification, and on knowledge, and rejects the idea that the epistemic standards change with practical stakes. Pragmatic factors can be relevant to the formation of belief and to the context of inquiry, although they are not relevant to epistemic evaluation. Epistemic value cannot depend upon such factors.

Palabras clave : pragmatic encroachment; sensitive invariantism; epistemic value; belief; knowledge.

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