Resumo

CAORSI, Carlos. Verdad y justificación en la filosofía de Donald Davidson. arete, 2011, vol.23, no.2, p.263-276. ISSN 1016-913X.

In this paper, I attempt to discuss the tensions that exist in Davidson’s work between his conception of beliefs as veridical by nature and its radical opposition to epistemic theories of truth. With this purpose, I introduce two modalities of philosophical elucidation: analytic non-reductive elucidation and connective elucidation. I also claim that these two modalities are characteristic of two periods of Davidson’s way of dealing with the concept of truth. I attempt to show that the consideration of these two types of elucidation allows shedding light on the way in which Davidson’s work deals with the problem of truth and on the particular above mentioned tension.

Palavras-chave: truth; justification; correspondence; truth conditions; Davidson.