Resumo

BURDMAN, Federico. Skepticism and Idealism in G.E Moore’s ‘Proof of an External World. arete [online]. 2015, vol.27, n.1, pp.45-67. ISSN 1016-913X.

G.E. Moore’s argument in "Proof of an External World" seems to beg the question against the skeptic and to miss the point of the challenge posed by skeptical hypotheses. I propose an interpretation that frees the argument from both charges. Starting from a distinction between the way Moore understood his dialectical position against the idealist and the skeptic, I attempt to illuminate the conception of skepticism that lies behind his argument. I propose that the argument’s core is found in a strong anti-Cartesian statement, even though its relevance for epistemology is to be found in its potential as a stance regarding justification which is closer to the problematic of Pyrrhonic skepticism.

Palavras-chave : idealism; skepticism; Cartesianism; common sense; certainty.

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