Resumo

GARGIULO, Teresa. The Doctrine of Incommensurability in Paul Feyerabend: An Objection Against a Particular Conception of Scientific Rationality. arete [online]. 2016, vol.28, n.1, pp.61-87. ISSN 1016-913X.

The doctrine of incommensurability has been the cause of many controversies and debates. In these discussions, the interpretation of this doctrine as an objection to objectivity, realism and scientific progress seems to be unanimous. However, this hermeneutical framework is too narrow to adequately understand Paul Feyerabend’s in formulating his doctrine of incommensurability. For he never intended to challenge these notions themselves, but only aimed at showing that the Neo-Positivist and Popperian Rationalist attempts to define them are futile. In addition, we argue that, in defining these notions, Paul Feyerabend’s conception of incommensurability avoids the apparatus developed by the Logical Positivists and Critical Rationalists. The goal of this article is to present his thesis of incommensurability as a challenge to a particular way of conceiving scientific rationality and its consequent notions of objectivity, progress and scientific realism.

Palavras-chave : Feyerabend; incommensurability; demarcation criterion; metaphysicsscience relationship; Kuhn.

        · resumo em Espanhol     · texto em Espanhol     · Espanhol ( pdf )