Abstract

VILATTA, Emilia. A Davidsonian Approach to Delusions: the Case of the Capgras Delusion. arete [online]. 2017, vol.29, n.1, pp.183-212. ISSN 1016-913X.  http://dx.doi.org/http://doi.org/10.18800/arete.201701.008.

Recently, some critics of Davidson’s approach of intentional attribution have pointed out that such a view cannot be applied to psychiatric delusions, since delusional beliefs do not satisfy the rational requirements it imposes. In this paper: i) I analyze, based on the Capgras syndrome case analysis, the objections to the idea that an agent can only be interpreted as having irrational beliefs against a background of rationality; ii) I object this criticism and I argue that this delusion does not represent a true counterexample to Davidson’s requirements, since an appropriate evaluation shows that subjects with Capgras syndrome still preserve a background of rationality. Thus, I will conclude that in such cases the minimum conditions for attributing intentional states are guaranteed.

Keywords : delusions; Capgras syndrome; intentional ascription; Donald Davidson; rationality.

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