1.1. The Sophist’s objection

Like the original objection, this new objection is put into the mouth of the sophist. The Stranger says that the sophist will now object that “some forms participate in non-being, while others do not, and speech and opinion are among those that do not participate” (260d6-8; τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ µὲν µετέχειν τοῦ µὴ ὄντος, τὰ δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ λόγον δὴ καὶ δόξαν εἶναι τῶν οὐ µετεχόντων)². The sophist will argue that “opinion and speech do not have communion with non-being” (206e1-2; δόξα καὶ λόγος οὐ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ µὴ ὄντος) and that “without this communion established, falsehood is not at all” (260e2-3; ψεῦδος γὰρ τὸ παράπαν οὐκ εἶναι ταύτης µὴ συνισταµένης τῆς κοινωνίας). The Stranger presents the sophist as willing to grant the account of non-being developed so far (260c11-d6). Hence, the sophist will grant that non-being is a kind and that it is distributed through all beings (κατὰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα διεσπαρµένον) (260b7-8), insofar as each being is not those from which it is different. What the sophist will not grant, and what the Stranger has not explicitly shown, is that speech, opinion, or appearance participate in non-being. Although the Stranger has demonstrated that non-being is a form, he has not explicitly claimed that anything participates in non-being. The Stranger has so far claimed that participation in the form different is what is responsible for the fact that each being is in various ways a non-being. Thus, the sophist has found room to object that although perhaps some forms participate in non-being, speech, opinion, and appearance do not.

Participation in the typical sense, however, does not seem to be what is at stake in the sophist’s objection³. The typical formula for participation in form is that x is F because it participates in F. In the Phaedo, for example, Socrates claims that things other than the beautiful are beautiful because they participate in the beautiful (Phaed., 100c3-102a1). Likewise, earlier in the Sophist, the Stranger claimed that motion is a being because it participates in being, motion is the same because it participates in same, and motion is different because it participates in different (Soph., 255e3-256d9). The claim “motion is not” is an inference from the fact that motion is different due to its participation in different. Thus, motion is not same because it participates in different relative to same; motion is not being because it participates in different relative to being (see esp. 256b2-4). The point of contention in the sophist’s objection, however, is not whether speech is not whatever differs from it. The sophist grants what the Stranger has demonstrated up to this point. Consequently, he grants that speech is not whatever it differs from, and that speech is a non-being in the sense that it is different from the form being. The participation in non-being that the sophist’s objection denies to speech, therefore, is an atypical sense of participation. The participation in non-being relevant to the sophist’s objection is a participation that results in the possibility of saying what is not. If speech participates in non-being, speech can be false; whereas if speech does not participate in non-being, all speech will be true (see 260c1-3)⁴.

One might be tempted to think that the sophist’s objection here is a mere sophism⁵. The objection seems to use the notion of participation in a way that considerably misunderstands it and could only seem plausible to someone who was unfamiliar with what it means to participate in a form. Yet although there is doubtless some sophism at play, I do not think the objection is merely sophistic. The Stranger frames the sophist’s objection so as to introduce the communion of speech and non-being. He then goes on to say that in order to demonstrate that falsehood is, he and Theaetetus must observe the communion of speech and non-being (260e5-261a1). While the sense of “participation” in the sophist’s objection is atypical, there is nevertheless a “communion” between speech and non-being that the Stranger thinks is worth observing. I argue that this communion is the way that the form non-being, on the one hand, and speech, opinion, and appearance, on the other, differ in nature from the beings they are about.

The Stranger describes the form non-being as “the contraposing (ἀντίθεσις)⁶ of the nature of part of different and of the nature of being, which are set against one another” (258a11-b1; ἡ τῆς θατέρου µορίου φύσεως καὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειµένων ἀντίθεσις). How exactly this should be understood is a matter of significant controversy⁷. For our purposes, however, we only need note that the sort of contraposing definitive of the form non-being is one of a difference in nature. The contraposing is of the nature of a part of different and the nature of being. Thus, the focus is not, as it was earlier in the digression (esp. 255e3-257a6), on what we would today call “numerical difference”. In the context of the Sophist, we can say that beings numerically differ insofar as they participate in same relative to themselves and participate in different relative to one another. I am contrasting numerical difference so defined to difference in nature. By “difference in nature”, I mean the difference of one nature from another. In the case of forms, each numerical difference has a corresponding difference in nature. According to the Stranger, each form “is different from the others not because of its own nature, but because of participating in the idea of different” (255e4-6; ἓν ἕκαστον γὰρ ἕτερον εἶναι τῶν ἄλλων οὐ διὰ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ µετέχειν τῆς ἰδέας τῆς θατέρου). For example, the difference of the form rest from the form motion is a numerical difference, since the form rest and the form motion each participate in same relative to themselves and in different relative to one another (255e3-256d9). Yet the difference between the form rest and the form motion is also a difference in nature, since each form has one unique nature, with the result that if the form rest -the form whose unique nature is the nature of rest- is different from the form motion -the form whose unique nature is the nature of motion- the unique nature of rest can be said to be different from the unique nature of motion. The numerical difference forms have in relation to one another is what enables us to speak of the unique nature of each form as different from the unique nature of another. As we will see in Section 2 of this essay, the difference in nature of speech relative to the nature of beings is the communion that speech has with non-being. Before turning to that communion, however, we will do well to consider how the Stranger frames his response to the sophist’s objection.

1.2. The way the Stranger frames his response

The Stranger’s account of what speech is begins with an emphasis on the difference between forms, letters, and names. The Stranger says, “Come then, just as before we spoke concerning forms and letters (περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν καὶ τῶν γραµµάτων), let us again in like manner make an examination, this time concerning names (περὶ τῶν ὀνοµάτων)” (261d1-3)⁸. The Stranger explains that what he wants them to examine is “whether all fit together with one another, or none do, or whether some are willing to fit together with one another, while others are not” (261d6-7; εἴτε πάντα ἀλλήλοις συναρµόττει εἴτε µηδέν, εἴτε τὰ µὲν ἐθέλει, τὰ δὲ µή). Earlier in the digression, the Stranger had asked this question concerning forms, and used the way letters fit together into syllables and words to help clarify how forms fit together (251c8-254d2). Theaetetus, therefore, is familiar with this sort of question. The answer in the case of both forms and letters was that some determinate forms or letters are able to fit together with one another while other determinate forms or letters are not. Hence, when faced with the same question about names, Theaetetus immediately and confidently replies that some are able to fit together with one another, while others are not (261d8). The Stranger responds by saying, “Perhaps you mean something of this sort: when [names] are said in succession and also disclose something (δηλοῦντά τι), they fit together, whereas when they signify nothing (µηδὲν σηµαίνοντα) in sequence, they do not fit together” (261d9-e2). Theaetetus, however, is baffled by this response (261e3)⁹. It becomes clear that he agreed that names combine like letters and forms do, without considering the nature of naming or speaking and without observing the difference between how things combine in the case of speech, on the one hand, and how they combine in the case of forms or beings, on the other¹⁰. The Stranger, therefore, offers an account of the composition of speech and sets it in contrast to the composition of beings.

The approach the Stranger takes in giving his account of speech is to offer an analysis of what he calls the first (πρῶτον) and smallest (ἐλάχιστον) sort of speech (262c10, 263a3-4)¹¹. From the examples he uses, it is clear that what the Stranger has in mind by the “first” and “smallest” sort of speeches are two-word statements¹². Thus, by “first” he means the most basic or fundamental, and by the “smallest” he means that composed of the fewest words: one name or noun (ὄνοµα) and one verb or predicative expression (ῥῆµα)¹³. Given that it would be unnatural to call this sort of thing a “speech” in English, I will sometimes translate “logos” as “speech” and at other times translate it as “statement”, depending on the context¹⁴.

The nature of speech calls for a certain compositional structure among the sorts of vocal signs (τὰ τῆς φωνῆς σηµεῖα, see 262d9) that compose it. The Stranger points out that neither a set of nouns said in succession -such as “lion stag horse” (262b9-10)- nor a set of verbs strung together -such as “walks sleeps runs” (262b5)- compose a statement. Instead, nouns and verbs combine together to form statements. It is in this sense that some determinate vocal signs fit together while others to not.

While the nature of speech calls for a compositional structure among vocal signs, the nature of beings calls for a compositional structure among things that are. In his account of falsehood, the Stranger initially describes what I am calling “things that are” as forms (261d1), but ends by simply calling them “things” (πράγµατα) (262d8). These “things” are clearly the “things that are, things that are coming to be, things that have come to be, or things that will come to be” that the Stranger claims speech is about (262d2-3; περὶ τῶν ὄντων ἢ γιγνοµένων ἢ γεγονότων ἢ µελλόντων). Just as in the case of speech some determinate vocal signs fit together with one another whereas others do not, so in the case of beings some determinate things fit together with one another whereas others do not (262d8-e1). What it is to be human, for example, fits together with what it is to understand, while it does not fit together with what it is to fly. Humans are a kind of being that understands, not a kind of being that flies.

Although in the case of both speech and being (οὐσία) some of the determinate constituents of each fit together with one another whereas others do not, there are significant differences in their compositional structures. The things combined are different: vocal signs in the case of speech and things that are in the case of being. More importantly, the norms according to which they combine are different. Any noun, for example, can fit together with any verb or predicative expression (ῥῆµα) to compose a statement, regardless of the things they respectively signify¹⁵. In the case of things that are, in contrast, each fits together with others in a unique way. Angling, for instance, fits together with expertise, hunting, and various kinds of fishing in a way that no other kind does. In this respect, the norms that govern the composition of things that are -the norms known by the expert in dialectic (253b9-d3)¹⁶- are much more stringent than those that govern the composition of a speech or statement.

2.1. The relevant difference between speech and beings is a difference in nature

As I mentioned earlier, the sort of difference the Stranger identifies with the form non-being is the contraposing of the nature of being with the nature of the part of different set against it (258a11-b1). The form non-being, therefore, is constituted by a difference in nature, rather than simply a numerical difference. In the same way, the difference of vocal signs relative to things that are is not a numerical difference, since speech, vocal signs, nouns, verbs, and so on are all things that are. Speech and the vocal signs that compose it are beings, just like everything else. Thus, speech, nouns, verbs, and so on each share in a unique group of forms, just as angling or any other being does. Nouns and verbs, for example, are both a kind of vocal sign: verbs a kind that signify actions and nouns a kind that signify the things doing the actions (261e4-262a7). Qua things that are, vocal signs combine with other beings according to the norms that govern beings. Qua components of a statement, in contrast, vocal signs combine according to the basic linguistic norms that govern statement composition.

According to the norms governing statement composition, any nouns can combine with any verbs to compose a statement. Given that verbs signify actions and nouns signify things doing actions, the norms that govern statement composition allow for a speaker to put together any things with any actions by means of nouns and verbs (see 262e13-14 ff.)¹⁷. The norms that govern statement composition are indifferent to whether the determinate things and actions the speaker puts together in a given statement fit together “in reality”, which is to say qua things that are. The statement “Theaetetus flies”, for example, combines the thing Theaetetus with the action Flies by means of the noun “Theaetetus” and the verb “flies”. Yet qua things that are, Theaetetus and Flies do not fit together. In other words, the norms that govern beings do not permit the thing Theaetetus and action Flies to combine, whereas the norms that govern statement composition do permit them to combine. Ontologically, the thing Theaetetus fits with Sits and not with Flies. The noun “Theaetetus”, however, can fit together with any verb or predicative expression -“sits”, “flies”, “is a bird”, etc.- to compose a statement. The difference in the way things that are fit together and the way vocal signs fit together reflects the difference between the nature of beings, on the one hand, and the nature of speech, on the other. Thus, speech has communion with non-being insofar as its nature is different from the nature of beings and insofar as the structure it exacts on its constituent elements is different from the structure of beings.

2.2. The location of the Stranger’s description of the difference between speech and beings

According to the Stranger’s initial outline of his response to the sophist’s objection, he and Theaetetus are to observe the communion of non-being with speech, opinion, and appearance after tracking down what speech, opinion, and appearance are and before demonstrating that falsehood is (260e3-261a2)¹⁸. I think the Stranger’s account of falsehood follows this initial outline. The Stranger begins by giving an account of what speech is. We find out a little later that opinion and appearance amount to speech in different media. Opinions, according to the Stranger, are the assertions and denials of a speech that goes on in the medium of unvoiced thought (263e3-264a2). Appearances, in turn, are opinions that are present to someone through sense perception (δι’ αἰσθήσεως) (264a4-6). By giving an account of the noun-verb structure of speech, therefore, the Stranger has already given the core of his account of opinion and appearance. Consequently, all he has to do when he discusses opinion and appearance directly is state how they are speech in different media. While giving his account of what speech is, the Stranger begins to differentiate its nature and compositional structure from that of beings (see esp. 261d1 ff.). Then, immediately after completing his account of what speech is at 262d6, the Stranger notes the difference in compositional structure between things that are, on the one hand, and vocal signs, on the other (262d8-e1). I am arguing that this marks the observation of the communion of speech and non-being that he places in stage two of his initial outline. To observe the difference in nature of speech relative to beings is to observe the communion of speech with non-being. The Stranger’s demonstration that both truth and falsehood are qualities (ποῖα) of speech, stage three in his outline, immediately follows (262e4-264b4).

2.3. The difference in nature of speech and beings is what makes false speech possible

The difference in nature of speech relative to beings is what enables determinate statements to have the quality of falsehood. Statements can be true or false because by means of the nouns and verbs that compose them things and actions are combined that may or may not fit together ontologically. As mentioned above, the norms to which vocal signs must conform in order to compose statements allow a speaker to combine things and actions in ways that violate the norms that govern the composition of things that are. Statements that combine things and actions by means of nouns and verbs in ways that violate the norms that govern the composition of things that are have the quality of falsehood. Statements that combine things and actions in accordance with the norms that govern the composition of things that are have the quality of truth.

The Stranger offers four descriptions of why the statement “Theaetetus flies” is false and one description of why the statement “Theaetetus sits” is true. The true statement says about Theaetetus “things that are as they are” (263b4-5; λέγει δὲ αὐτῶν ὁ µὲν ἀληθὴς τὰ ὄντα ὡς ἔστιν περὶ σοῦ). The false statement, in contrast, says about Theaetetus (1) “things different from the things that are” (263b7; ὁ δὲ δὴ ψευδὴς ἕτερα τῶν ὄντων); (2) “things that are not as things that are” (263b9; τὰ µὴ ὄντ’ ἄρα ὡς ὄντα λέγει); (3) “things that are that are different from the things that are” (263b11; ὄντων δέ γε ὄντα ἕτερα περὶ σοῦ); and (4) “different things as the same things and things that are not as things that are” (263d1-2; περὶ δὴ σοῦ λεγόµενα, <λεγόµενα>¹⁹ µέντοι θάτερα ὡς τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ µὴ ὄντα ὡς ὅντα). Although how exactly these descriptions of true and false speech should be understood is controversial, the difference in nature between speech and beings is a key prerequisite in all the major interpretations recent commentators have put forward²⁰. Saying things different from things that are is possible because the things and actions a speaker combines by means of nouns and verbs need not be combined in the way that the things and actions the statement speaks about combine ontologically. Put otherwise, the things said in a given statement about the being that is its subject can be things that are different from, rather than the same as, the things that are in relation to that being. As the Stranger points out, “in relation to each thing there are many things that are and many that are not” (263b11-12; πολλὰ µὲν . . . ὄντα περὶ ἕκαστον εἶναί που, πολλὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα)²¹. To predicate things of the being that is the subject of a given statement, but things that are different from the things that are in relation to that being, is to say things that are not in relation to that being as if they were things that are in relation to that being. Therefore, saying things that are not, in the sense of saying what is false, is possible because speech can, by means of nouns and verbs, join things and actions that do not fit together qua things that are.