3.1 Between Old and New

In 1996, researchers Merrill Morris and Christine Ogan raised concerns in The Internet as Mass Medium about not considering the Internet as a mass medium in communication studies, given that the Internet model affected the “source-message-receiver” framework on which the field [of mass communication theories] is based. As a criterion for considering the Internet as a mass medium, they pointed to the volume of users connected to the network that had been reached by the late 90s (40 million) and also described each Internet service as a mediating technology:

Each of these specific Internet services can be viewed as we do with specific television stations, small-town newspapers, or special-interest magazines. None of these may reach a strictly mass audience, but in conjunction with all other broadcasters, newspapers and magazines distributed in the country, they constitute mass media categories. So the Internet itself would be considered the mass medium, while the individual sites and services are the components of which this medium is comprised (1996, p. n/a).

In another article, Christian ^{Sandvig (2015}) equates the cultural industry-using the term coined by the Frankfurt School to refer to the media-with the social media industry. He points out that, although there seems to be apparent opposition between the media and social media because they offer citizens a different model of participation in communication, they have evolved “into an elaborate system that selects social products and makes them popular based on obscure determinations of economic value” (Sandvig, 2015, p. 1). Sandvig indicates that social media also has a system of control over the visibility of content like that of media (^{Tambini and Labo, 2016}; ^{Nemitz and Pfeffer, 2021}). For Sandvig, social media is merely an extension of the media, and their novel feature is the social aspect, i.e., while the cultural industry constructs reality based on common life, digital platforms base their activity on human sociability.

In social media, the phenomenon of mass communication-understood as the transmission of messages to a very broad audience through one or several media channels -converges with that of mass media as the organization or instrument that mediates information. The description provided by ^{McQuail and Deuze (2020}) helps explain how the reality of mass media intertwines with the dynamics of mass communication. The authors also state that media can be personal or mass media, as perceived in the type of relationship media enable between audiences: symmetrical or institutionalized. Therefore, according to these variables, it can be said that social media platforms are personal media where a symmetrical relationship occurs between users. However, considering their reach, the effect they produce is self-communication of the masses (Castells, 2007).

On the other hand, from a more economic perspective, due to the monopolistic position digital platforms have occupied in the market, authors like Paul ^{Nemitz and Matthias Pfeffer (2021}) propose that they should be treated as media within the framework of media concentration law.

What the set of these proposals contributes is, first, that social media and the media resemble each other in their dominant position over the distribution of content in the public sphere.

Second, social media is personal media that disseminates content en masse. Thus, in terms of power and mass reach, social media can be considered to be on the same level as mass media. In any case, the study of social media in the field of communication should not to try to fit them or compare them with the structure of a hierarchical 19th-century corporation that controls public opinion; rather, it is necessary to expand the interpretative paradigm of a medium based on its purpose. ^{Martín Algarra (2020}) contrasts two paradigms from which media can be interpreted. On one hand, the transmission paradigm refers to the technical system that allows a message to be transported from one point to another regardless of its meaning, since the system is not concerned with “what is said in a message, why, for what purpose or how it is said” (Martín Algarra, 2020, p. 67). With this approach, one can understand that a telecommunications company offers connections and its service is based on the requirement that these connections are effective. If this were the interpretative point for media, they would be mere instruments with no responsibility for what occurs within them. It is precisely this narrative that platforms have attempted to uphold. On the other hand, the integration paradigm is one in which the purpose of communication is understood as the communion of individuals, and “in this case, communication fundamentally relates to the social dimension of human beings and the existence of a shared common world” (Martín Algarra, 2020, p. 67). From this paradigm, it is possible to assume that, just as a traditional medium aggregates the contributions of the public and creates public opinion, a social network serves as a medium for communion and relations among the audience.

Josu de ^{Miguel Bárcena (2016}) presents a historical fact that can serve as a reference by explaining that, in the late 1990s in Germany, with the advent of the Internet, there was debate regarding the categorization of the media used for transmitting communications. The division was made “taking into account whether the presentation of information or opinions primarily affected the formation of public opinion constituted by an indeterminate number of recipients” (García Morales, 1999). Bárcena proposes:

If we begin with a broad concept of the right to information, it is easy to conclude that, in the context of the digital press, the individualization of the medium does not prevent us from considering Facebook and Twitter as formats that contribute to shaping public opinion (2016, p. 150).

3.2. Towards a Theory of Social Media

The literature that seeks to develop a theory for social media as a distinct communicative phenomenon is limited and dispersed over time, and existing work tends to focus more on the field of public relations rather than on media studies. This is evident in issue 23 of the Atlantic Journal of Communication (Volume 1, 2015), which aimed to present normative preliminaries regarding social media. Authors such as ^{Carr and Hayes (2015}) contributed to this issue by highlighting that there is no commonly accepted definition of what social media are, either functionally or theoretically, within communication studies. They stated that “although we know what social media are, we are not necessarily able to articulate why they are what they are” (p. 46). They proposed a paradigm shift in communication theory that would include the role of computational or algorithmic elements, as well as the adoption of new methodologies to study interactions within the infrastructure of social media. Finally, they called for “a reconsideration of the convergence of communication and media studies, to better account for the role of the medium as both a modifier and a moderator in transmission of a message” (Carr and Hayes, 2015, p. 58). Additionally, in that issue of the journal, ^{Ariel and Avidar (2015}) explained that, considering the role individuals play in social media, three elements can distinguish a platform as a social network: information, interaction and sociability. Information pertains to what is shared, interactivity depends on how content is shared and sociability is the result of the number of interactions among users. Through their study, Ariel and Avidar demonstrated the importance of defining social media not so much by their technological characteristics but by how interactivity and sociability manifest within them.

^{Fuchs (2017}) pointed out that the need for a social theoretical foundation to understand the communication processes of social media within society is marked by an excessive quantitative focus in their studies.

Digital positivism’s limit is that it remains stuck in the narrowness of the Lasswell Formula, focusing its research on the following question: Who communicates what to whom on social media with what effects? It forgets users’ subjectivity, experiences, norms, values and interpretations, as well as the embeddedness of the media into society’s power structures and social struggles. We need a paradigm shift from administrative digital positivist big data analytics towards critical social media research. [...] Challenging big data analytics as the mainstream of digital media studies requires us to think about theoretical (ontological), methodological (epistemological) and ethical dimensions of an alternative paradigm (2017, p. 40).

The nomenclature of entities bears significant influence on their prescribed treatment.

Conventionally, a platform is conceptualized as a business model wherein interactions among its constituents generate value (Kumar, 2023). ^{Gillespie (2010}), referencing Bazerman (1999), elucidated that as the term “platform” evolved into a “discursive resting point,” innovations and regulations would align themselves with this technological interpretation. In the context of social media, the designation “platform” attenuates the understanding that information mediation is a fundamental function of these entities (^{Silverstone, 2002}). It is insufficient to characterize social media as a structure facilitating horizontal relationships among users who connect and interact instantaneously, with content contingent upon individual contributions. This characterization must incorporate the platform’s mediating role in information dissemination, as it elucidates why social media are attributed with an opinion-forming capacity (^{Seipp et al., 2023}) previously associated with traditional media. A paradigm is requisite to elucidate that the mediating function of social media in public communication engenders their accountability.

5.1. Focusing on the Subject, Not the Object

To address the discussion about the responsibility of social media, it is necessary to shift the focus from the object (content) to the subject (platforms). The discussion has centered on content such as misinformation, fake news and incitement messages, which have emerged in social conversation and disrupted coexistence among citizens and the political processes of democracy. However, while this content may cause problems, it is not the problem. The discussion on the relevance of a series of messages in the public sphere is bound to enter a deadlock between content moderation and freedom of expression while raising questions such as which messages are intolerable and who should censor them. In societies in which freedom of expression is a foundational value necessary for coexistence, the dissemination of opinions, no matter how extreme, should not be a problem. On the other hand, for content classified as illegal, judicial procedures have been established in each country’s legal system.

By referencing media organizations as a media phenomenon in which social media are compared, the sender-receiver-message scheme is used as a model to assign responsibilities. However, without digital platforms, this is unfair. ^{Poell (2020}) argues that, although platforms play a fundamental role in public communication, it is not the same as that of media organizations, and states “it is highly questionable whether it is a good idea to give corporations, with little editorial expertise or understanding of particular political-cultural contexts and histories, full editorial responsibility over what is shared through their platforms” (Poell, 2020, p. 653). Given how content is created in media companies, it can be asserted that they have editorial responsibility for such content, given that the content creator, host and distributor are the same, which is not the case with social media, where the user is the creator, but the platform is the host and distributor. ^{Helberger, Pierson, and Poell (2018}) argue that the difficulty in determining where the platform’s responsibility ends and the user’s begins is due to the unequal power relationship between users and platforms; it is also common in law to assign responsibility to the party that

is the source of a risk that may give rise to legal responsibilities. The problem presented by assigning responsibility to platforms is what the authors call the “problem of many hands,” using ^{Thompson’s (2014}) concept to explain “the difficulty of assigning responsibility in organizations in which many different individuals contribute to decisions and policies” (Thompson, 2014, p. 259). In response, Thompson (2014) proposes that we “shift our perspective from the respon-sibility for outcomes to the responsibility for the design of organizations.” (Thompson, 2014, p. 261). In other words, one should not speak of the editorial responsibility of digital platforms concerning content (^{Boix Palop, 2016}), but rather of a structural responsibility as intermediaries of information. This is the connection between the responsibility of digital platforms and the right to information.

I propose an analogy: a company that manufactures plastic caps for bottles is not responsible for those caps littering beaches, as they ended up there due to the irresponsible behavior of other people. However, the company is responsible for manufacturing caps with materials that have minimal environmental impact because the company introduced a risk factor that could harm a good (the environment) and that risk did not exist before it intervened. The existence of a good to be protected justifies responsibility, and responsibility lies with the subject that relates to that good that must be protected. In the case of social media, although harmful content generates problems in society, it is not the problem; rather, it is evidence of the platform’s prior omission of responsibility. Digital platforms must assume responsibility for the risk factors they have introduced into public communication through their designs, algorithms and dominant position by subjecting their services to scrutiny.

5.2. The Structural Responsibility of Social Media

The discursive positioning on which digital platforms have based their defense of neutrality is that they are mere services for connecting users (^{Spindler, 2020}). This narrative was reflected in the legislation regarding them. The E-Commerce Directive 2000/31/EC, whose aim was to establish a legal framework for the entire European Union to regulate information society services, to guarantee the free movement of services and to protect consumers and users, established various legal aspects of information society services and categorized platforms as “service providers” (E-Commerce Directive, 2000/31/EC, p. 4) of the information society. The E-commerce law established several premises as a starting point for platform services; perhaps the most notable in this case is the argument regarding the responsibility of intermediary services, outlined in Section 4. In this section, Article 12 recognizes them as mere intermediaries in the transmission of communications, data and accessibility to other services; Article 13 exempts them from responsibility for the automatic, temporary and provisional storage of data to provide their services; Article 14 addresses the hosting of actual data, and Article 15 exempts them from any responsibility by stating “Member States shall not impose a general obligation on providers, when providing the services covered by Articles 12, 13 and 14, to monitor the information which they transmit or store, nor a general obligation actively to seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity” (E-Commerce Directive, 2000/31/EC, p. 13). The exemptions from liability established by the 2000 Directive were granted on the condition that the platform service was unaware of any type of information or illegal activity, meaning that it should act only to remove such information if it became aware of it. The problem is that framing responsibility in this way has favored the conception of platforms as mere content hosts. As Valpuesta points out, this rule has long served Internet intermediaries to claim exemption from responsibility for illegal activities carried out by the pages they link to, with the well-known grey areas, when such intermediaries are aware or should be aware of that illegal activity (2021, p. 57).

Knowledge of the illegality (or lack thereof) of content was an essential requirement for determining the responsibility of an information intermediary service regarding content.

However, as Valpuesta (2021, p. 26) points out, this argument gained relevance in the case of platforms, which are often claimed to be merely intermediaries providing access to services to avoid being considered providers of the main service.

In October 2022, the European Union adopted the Digital Services Act (DSA) (Directive 2000/31/ EC), which builds on the aforementioned directive and aims to define the responsibility of digital platforms and search engines, especially large ones, and protecting citizens’ rights. The

DSA aims to regulate “intermediary services” (Directive 2000/31/EC, p. 1) in the information society. The change or adjustment in nomenclature (from “providers” to “intermediaries”) is not a minor issue; it has ontological implications in the conception of the responsibility of platforms. Regarding the liability regime, the DSA maintains the conceptual framework of the E-Commerce Directive (platforms are responsible if they know) but adds specific obligations for these intermediaries: it implements alert mechanisms for the awareness of illegal content and a series of procedures for overall transparency in the functioning of online platforms. Why expand the responsibility of platforms by adding procedural obligations? Although the initial premise is that platforms are not responsible for the content disseminated on them, it is now established that they must subject their services to continuous evaluation because of the impact of their services may cause societal risks (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, recital 76). Does this phenomenon arise from the inherent implication that the mediation of information in the public sphere confers natural responsibility to those who function as information intermediaries? The role of social media platforms as information intermediaries enables them to manage information flows by providing space for content and serving as channels for its distribution and organization (^{De Gregorio, 2022}; ^{van Dalen, 2023}; ^{Marta-Lazo, 2023}). This function defines their information mediation process.

It may seem incompatible for social media to be responsible for being information mediators while simultaneously not being responsible for content freely created by users. Consciously or unconsciously, the DSA goes one step further. Even when the platform is not responsible for the content because it has no knowledge of it, the DSA stipulates that the platform must fulfill certain obligations, including transparency, accountability and empowering the user with a series of functionalities. If the natural state of a platform is non-responsibility for content, why does the Commission require it to comply with certain protocols? Because it does not oblige them as content creators, but as hosts of that content, as intermediaries and as a structure that has power over the flow of information. In other words, by imposing obligations on their services, this legislation recognizes that it is fair to demand something from platforms in their structural conception and responsibilities can only be demanded from those who do something with what they have. This is the natural responsibility of a platform for being an intermediary. Therefore, it is coherent to assert that digital platforms are not responsible for the authorship of content and that they are responsible for being hosts of the content generated by users. Structural responsibility is not based on censoring or controlling content, but on creating an environment in which the right to information is respected and protected in a balanced manner with transparent processes and accountability to users. In this case, Thompson states

we also need to adopt a forward-looking conception of responsibility-what may be called pros-pective design responsibility. We examine past failures-but chiefly for the purpose of preven-ting future ones. In carrying out such an examination, we first need to locate, as far as possible, not only the structural defects in the organization but also the individual actions that may have contributed to the failure. That is necessary so that we can separate the structural defects from the individual errors (2014, p. 261).

It is the platform’s responsibility to create a space conducive to exercising fundamental rights (Regulation (EU) 2022/2065, recital 79; recital 81). Digital platforms must be able to think and evaluate whether their funding model, technical elements or the dynamics of their processes promote or undermine rights, such as access to information, knowledge, the right to understand, the right to receive truthful information and the right to privacy.